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I. INTRODUCTION 
I look forward to the publication of HEALTHISM: HEALTH 
STATUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (hereinafter Healthism), 
by Jessica L. Roberts of the University of Houston Law Center 
and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard of the University of Georgia Law 
School. 
On November 4, 2016, at the invitation of Professors  
Roberts and Weeks, I participated in a conference in which the 
discussants commented on Roberts and Weeks’ forthcoming book 
and shared thoughts about the relevance of that work to various 
related fields.  What follows here is somewhat different than 
those comments—although the general themes are the same—
and is so in part because, four days after the conference, Donald 
J. Trump was, contrary to the predictions of virtually all  
knowledgeable observers,1 elected the 45th president of the 
United States. 
As I explain in more detail below, I am concerned that the 
Trump Administration will distract scholars from continuing 
important work they have begun, and, relatedly, from fully  
engaging with the works of other scholars that deserve  
attention.  Roberts and Weeks’ novel is such a work, and one 
that has already, through the process of scholarly engagement, 
evolved in promising directions that should continue, even after 
the book’s publication.  Although I cannot say I agree with every 
argument the book makes, I would be incredibly disappointed 
and discouraged if this provocative and conversation-starting 
book did not receive the attention, praise, and criticism it clearly 
deserves merely because the nation elected to its highest office a 
person as singularly outlandish and attention-consuming as our 
45th president.2 
II. HIDDEN DANGERS IN THE AGE OF PRESIDENT TRUMP 
The election of Donald J. Trump—and the tumultuous  
 
1. Maya Rhodan & David Johnson, Here are 7 Electoral College Predictions for 
Tuesday, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4561625/electoral-college-predictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/QNY9-3GDM]. 
2. I do not consider myself particularly political and am not a political expert.  
But the election of President Trump was so system-jarring that ignoring it seems a 
strange choice.  While Donald Trump was not the person I had hoped would become 
President, now that he is, I continue to hope that my worst fears about President 
Trump will turn out to be wrong, and that he will use his considerable talents to  
improve, rather than ruin, our great but imperfect nation.   
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beginnings of his Administration—seems to have overshadowed 
everything else in the room.  Little about his campaign or  
conduct gave any of the nearly 66 million citizens who voted for 
his opponent3 any confidence that he would act in the interests 
of all Americans, or even within the traditional bounds of  
presidential propriety.  The first days of the Trump  
Administration aggravated, rather than assuaged, those  
concerns.   
President Trump opened his term with a bizarre falsehood 
and tantrum: he lied about the size of his inauguration crowd, 
an assertion easily disprovable by publicly available  
photographs, which the press quickly pointed out.4  President 
Trump, infuriated, ordered his then Press Secretary, Sean  
Spicer, to conduct an impromptu press conference during which 
Spicer (1) took no questions, (2) berated the press for reporting 
the truth, and (3) repeated the demonstrably falsity about crowd 
size in response to the press’s coverage.5  Still unhappy about his 
popular vote defeat, President Trump also continued to insist 
that the three to five million votes cast for Hillary Clinton to win 
her the majority were fraudulent or otherwise illegal, an  
assertion that is completely unsubstantiated and for which there 
is no colorable evidence.6  A few days later, President Trump  
insulted the Mexican administration enough that the Mexican 
president, Enrique Peña Nieto, cancelled a previously planned 
 
3. President Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes, a fact 
which has prompted him “to falsely claim that millions of unauthorized immigrants 
had robbed him of a popular vote majority.”  Michael D. Shear & Emmarie 
Huetteman, Trump Repeats Lie About Popular Vote in Meeting With Lawmakers, 
N.Y. TIMES, A1 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
4. Elle Hunt, Trump’s Inauguration Crowd: Sean Spicer’s Claims Versus the Ev-
idence, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/22/trump-inauguration-crowd-sean-spicers-claims-versus-the-evidence 
[https://perma.cc/5LS9-KCRF]. 
5. Id.  See also Chris Cilliza, Sean Spicer Held a Press Conference. He Didn’t 
Take Questions. Or Tell The Whole Truth, WASH. POST, (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/21/sean-spicer-held-a-
press-conference-he-didnt-take-questions-or-tell-the-whole-truth [https://perma.cc/ 
B633-5P67] (describing the conference and Spicer’s refusal to take questions).  Of 
course, President Trump’s general obsession with size is well-known.  As a  
candidate, he bristled at sniggering remarks about his small hands, which urban 
legend holds is a proxy for the size of a man’s genitals.  Stung by a primary rival’s 
joke about his hands (and thus his penis), Trump felt compelled to “guarantee” the 
audience, in a nationally televised presidential debate, that he there was “no  
problem” with the size of his sexual organ.  Gregory Krieg, Donald Trump Defends 
Size of His Penis, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/03/politics 
/donald-trump-small-hands-marco-rubio/ [https://perma.cc/N8VV-HD7M].   
6. See Shear & Huetteman, supra note 3. 
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trip,7 shouted at and hung up on the Prime Minister of  
Australia,8 and appeared to express the belief that Frederick 
Douglass—the former slave and abolitionist titan who died in 
1895—was still alive.9 
While the president spoke favorably of Mr. Douglass,10 his 
solicitude for activism did not extend to today’s protesters, who 
the president referred to as “[p]rofessional anarchists, thugs[,] 
and paid protesters.”11  In addition to virtually every other thing 
that President Trump has done, including alleged housing  
discrimination in the 1970s12 and disparaging civil rights hero 
John Lewis,13 his recent actions suggest that Douglass, were he 
alive, would not welcome the President’s endorsement.  Nor is 
the President’s assertion that the protesters are paid true.14   
Rather, it is a canard invented and promoted by various fringe 
sites.15 
The new President’s actions were, for many, even more  
discouraging than his words.  Most infamously, President Trump 
 
7. Daniella Diaz, Mexican President Cancels Meeting with Trump, CNN (Jan. 27, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/mexico-president-donald-trump-
enrique-pena-nieto-border-wall/ [https://perma.cc/B4Z6-EHJY].  
8. Joe Tacopino, Trump Blasted Australian Prime Minister During ‘Worst Call 
By Far’, N.Y. POST (Feb. 1, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017/02/01/trump-blasted-
australian-prime-minister-during-worst-call-by-far/ [https://perma.cc/3EEK-8888].   
9. Question of the Day: Does Trump Think Frederick Douglass is Still Alive?, 
PASTE MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2017) https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/ 
2017/02/question-of-the-day-does-trump-think-frederick-dou.html [https://perma.cc/ 
S4Z7-J6NY]. 
10. Id. 
11. @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:48 AM) https://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/827483841589891073 [https://perma.cc/BN2P-3BDU]. 
12. In 1973, the Justice Department sued Donald Trump for violating the Fair 
Housing Act in connection with Trump’s refusing to rent dwellings and negotiate for 
the rental of dwellings with persons because of race and color.  Michael Kranish and 
Robert O’Harrow Jr., Inside the Government’s Racial Bias Case Against Donald 
Trump’s Company, and How He Fought It, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-governments-racial-bias-case-
against-donald-trumps-company-and-how-he-fought-it/2016/01/23/fb90163e-bfbe-
11e5-bcda-62a36b394160_story.html [https://perma.cc/S6HX-684E].  Donald Trump 
settled the case without an admission of guilt.  Id. 
13. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., In Feud With John Lewis, Donald Trump Attacked 
‘One of the Most Respected People in America’, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/15/in-feud-with-john-lewis-
donald-trump-attacked-one-of-the-most-respected-people-in-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/T8TV-KDNV]. 
14. Dan Evon, Demand Protest, SNOPES (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.snopes.com/paid-protesters-donald-trumps-inauguration/ 
[https://perma.cc/8YLD-FBGG]. 
15. Id. 
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issued an executive order targeting immigrants from seven  
Muslim-majority nations16 that (1) apparently resulted from a 
phone call to former New York City mayor Rudy Guiliani about 
how the Trump Administration might implement a “Muslim 
Ban,”17 (2) led to his acting Attorney General refusing to enforce 
it,18 (3) resulted in spontaneous nationwide protests,19 (4)  
inexplicably barred green-card holders from entering the United 
States,20 and (5) resulted in the one-hour detention of the former 
Prime Minister of Norway because he had visited Iran, one of 
the banned countries.21  The Executive Order was immediately 
(and at least temporarily) successfully challenged in Federal 
Court,22 after which the President directly attacked the  
legitimacy of the judge who enjoined the ban, James L. Robart—
a Republican nominated judge who was unanimously confirmed 
by the Senate.23 
The above instances are only a sampling of the preposterous 
things President Trump did in the first month of his presidency; 
it does not even reach policy decisions that are wrong within 
 
16. Exec. Order No.13, 769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry 
Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
17. Amy Wang, Trump Asked For a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says — and Ordered 
A Commission to Do It ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-
muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/ 
[https://perma.cc/4WDL-P3WH].  
18. Jordan Fabian, Trump Fires Acting AG for Refusing to Defend Travel Ban, 
THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2017) http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/317018-trump-
fires-acting-ag-for-refusing-to-defend-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/2JCV-4ZCK]. 
19. Emanuella Grinberg & Madison Park, 2nd Day of Protests Over Trump’s 
Immigration Policies, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:42 AM) http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/01/29/politics/us-immigration-protests/ [https://perma.cc/ 78W7-WFYW]. 
20. Dan Merica, How Trump’s Travel Ban Affects Green Card Holders and Dual 
Citizens, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-trump-
travel-ban-green-card-dual-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/PUQ6-GAW8]. 
21. Nadia Khomani, Former Norway PM Held at Washington Airport Over 2014 
Visit to Iran, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
us-news/2017/feb/03/former-norway-pm-bondevik-held-washington-dulles-airport-
2014-visit-iran [https://perma.cc/8DS2-M7QU]. 
22. State of Washington v. Donald J. Trump, et al., Case No. C17-0141JLR, Doc. 
52 (W.D. Wash. 2017).  The court issued a TRO, which was immediately appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals.  By the time this essay is published, surely the 
case will have been resolved, and the Trump Administration may very well prevail.   
23. On Twitter, President Trump “denigrated Judge Robart as a ‘so-called judge’ 
and described the judge’s order as ‘ridiculous.’”  Thomas Fuller, ‘So-Called’ Judge 
Criticized by Trump Is Known as a Mainstream Republican, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-ban-
seattle.html [https://perma.cc/MR96-LNML].  Robart was nominated by George W. 
Bush and confirmed 99-0 by the Senate.  Id. 
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normal parameters.  Bad decisions unaccompanied by a media 
frenzy or that do not pose a direct threat to the Republic have 
received only modest attention.  An early example of this is  
President Trump’s delay in implementing a federal regulation 
that required financial investment advisors to act in the best  
interests of their clients, rather than themselves.24  This rule—
which the Department of Labor (DOL) had worked on for over 
six years—was intended to ensure that financial advisors could 
not take advantage of their customers.25  It is one that  
Democrats and Republicans certainly may, in the normal course, 
disagree over.  However, the rule affects the management of  
trillions of dollars, and given the nation’s use of 401(k) accounts 
as the primary mechanism for funding retirement,26 is a rule of 
massive long-term consequence.  Nonetheless, the distinct  
feeling I get is that the issue has gotten vastly less coverage 
than it would have gotten in a “normal” administration, such as, 
for example, a Kasich or Rubio administration. 
Now, certainly the primary danger is that the President and 
his Administration will take actions that will either  
permanently damage the country or undermine the rule of law 
and democracy itself.27  That is true of any administration, but 
the Trump Administration in particular presents the most acute 
risk in modern American history.  As a result, even the most 
somber of observers are right to watch carefully for catastrophe 
or creeping autocracy.  At present, the saying, “when there is a 
fire in the room, the first priority must be ensuring that it does 
not burn everything down,” seems particularly relevant. 
That said, it would be truly terrible if yet another negative 
consequence of “Trumpism” was that careful, difficult, and  
nuanced scholarly work might get much less attention than it 
would in calmer times.  Scholars often have important ideas that 
take years, if not decades, before some version of that idea  
 
24. DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ON FIDUCIARY DUTY RULE 
(Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/  
presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule [https://perma.cc/ 9YUQ-NBB5]. 
25. Kevin Liptak, Trump to take steps rolling back financial regulations, CNN 
(Feb. 3, 2017, 2:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/politics/trump-financial-
executive-actions/ [https://perma.cc/FNB8-WZWF]. 
26. DOL Fiduciary Rule Explained As Of July 5th, 2017, INVESTOPEDIA (July 5, 
2017, 10:45 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/updates/dol-fiduciary-rule/ 
[https://perma.cc/MAF3-CDSF] 
27. David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, THE ATLANTIC (March 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/ 
513872/ [https://perma.cc/L3D2-EJJA].  Frum is a former speechwriter of President 
George W. Bush. 
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becomes regularly accepted by the public.  Those ideas are less 
likely to be ready for mainstream consumption if they have not 
been vigorously developed through natural scholarly processes—
which require time, attention, engagement, critique, and  
iteration. 
Roberts and Weeks’ Healthism is a book that advances and 
develops an interesting and subtle idea: that we should be  
mindful, in writing and in applying laws, about discriminating 
against people based on their health status.28  Not all  
discrimination is bad, but clearly some is, and our notions of  
justice and optimality will look different if we understand and 
internalize that idea.  Roberts and Weeks have already evolved 
the idea of “healthism” in their respective writings, and it will 
continue to evolve as the coming book exposes more individuals 
to the core set of principles that animates the theory.29   
However, it will only do so if people are free to pay attention and 
engage in constructive debate.  I hope, in spite of the Trump 
Administration, that they do. 
III. HEALTHISM AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
Health statuses vary amongst people.  Sometimes those 
with certain health statuses are discriminated against, and such 
health discrimination is either justified or it is not.30  Roberts 
and Weeks’ theory of “healthism” identifies health  
discrimination as a commonly occurring practice throughout 
modern society and modern law (including, in reference to  
employment, insurance, health-care access, reproductive  
technology, and the judicial system).31  Beyond cataloguing its 
pervasiveness, Roberts and Weeks offer an approach for  
determining when health status discrimination is undesirable,32 
such as when it results in a systematic, normative wrong.33   
Determining what types of health discrimination result in  
 
28.  JESSICA ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH STATUS 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2017). 
29.  See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment  
Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014); Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 850 (2016). 
30.  Julianne Cheek, Healthism: A New Conservatism?, 18 QUALITATIVE HEALTH 
RESEARCH 974, 974 (2008). 
31.  ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.  
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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normative wrongs and what types do not is,34 as Roberts and 
Weeks acknowledge, a challenging task and one that will  
continue to evolve.35  In fact, Roberts and Weeks readily concede 
that some health discrimination is salutary.36 
Whatever the conceptual challenges of defining  
unambiguously and comprehensively the elements of  
undesirable healthism, Roberts and Weeks’ book shows how  
pervasive health discrimination is generally,37 how frequently 
health discrimination leads to normative wrongs,38 and how 
much of the latter conduct nonetheless escapes legal sanction.39  
Put slightly differently, if we imagine health discrimination as 
either justified or unjustified, for far too long people have  
assumed that the former category dwarfs the latter.  Roberts 
and Weeks upend this assumption and propose how the law 
might respond.40 
The classic example of healthism, advanced by Roberts  
several years ago, is obesity.41  Obesity is a health status that 
“tends to correlate with poor health” and may affect an  
employer’s group premium or a worker’s productivity.42  Yet 
permitting employers to discriminate on the basis of obesity in 
connection with employment decisions is likely to have  
meaningful undesirable consequences, such as disparately  
impacting already disadvantaged groups, perpetuating existing 
socioeconomic health disparities, and contributing to social  
stigmas directed at heavier people.43 
Roberts and Weeks point out in their book that people who 
have medical conditions, such as diabetes, that highly correlate 
with, and sometimes are the result of obesity,44 are protected by 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).45  A disability is a 
mental or physical impairment that must substantially limit the 
ability to perform one major life activity.46  Diabetes qualifies, 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. See generally Roberts, supra note 29. 
42. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
45. Id.  
46. Id. 
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and thus, one cannot refuse to hire or fire a person merely  
because they have diabetes.47  Being obese, however, is generally 
not protected under the ADA because “courts have been  
reluctant to hold that obesity meets the legal definition of  
disability.”48  In turn, this leads to an odd result: an individual 
can be fired for having a pre-condition, like obesity, that could, 
but has not yet, lead to a disability like diabetes, however, one 
cannot be fired once the disability has manifested itself.49 
While there are other ways to explain this curious result, 
Roberts and Weeks’ work reminds us that we should not be so 
quick to accept the consequences without scrutiny.50  There is 
demonstrable judicial reluctance to interpret the ADA and other 
federal statutes to protect against obesity—either by refusing to 
categorize it as a disability or otherwise.51  This may be because 
few have thought carefully about the presumption that obesity 
or another health status is a “bad” characteristic that does not 
deserve protection unless it is conjoined with some other  
characteristic the law already protects.52  The contrary notion, 
that health status alone should deserve protection unless there 
is a very good reason not to protect it against discriminatory 
conduct,53 is a keen insight and one that, while not persuasive in 
every instance, has opened up fertile ground for scholars and  
reformers to engage and debate for social and legal reform.54 
One of my own areas of expertise is employee benefits, and 
Roberts and Weeks’ work shares important commonalities that 
intersect with both benefit scholarship and the themes that  
animate reform discussions therein.55  The field of employee 
benefits is not particularly accessible to outsiders.56  The  
technicalities and jargon particular in the field are described  
below. 
The central statute in the world of employee benefits is the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).57  
 
47. See Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 858-59. 
48. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28. 
49. Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 852.   
50. Roberts, supra note 29, at 594. 
51. See Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 858-59. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 861-62. 
54. Id. at 855-59. 
55. Id. at 844. 
56. Id. at 906-07. 
57. Health Plans & Benefits: ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa [https://perma.cc/Y6BB-6CCA] 
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The enduring perspicacity of Greek myths, which continue to  
offer insight almost three millennia after they were first uttered 
by itinerant storytellers seeking hot meals on a breezy  
archipelago, draw on similar parallels as ERISA.  Apposite are 
the Gorgons, who were terrifying creatures feared by all sensible 
persons.58  Medusa, the most famous Gorgon, was particularly 
fearsome.59  She was part snake and part human, and had  
poisonous blood and a gaze that could petrify those who dared 
stare upon her.60  ERISA has a similar terrifying reputation.61  
Most avoid the law because there are significant casualties, and 
the successful ones try not to directly contemplate its depth.62  
Our engagement here will be mercifully brief. 
ERISA was enacted because of Congressional concern about 
something other than health insurance—pensions.63  Indeed, 
Congress spent years studying the failures of the private pension 
system and considered ERISA to primarily be a “pension bill of 
rights.”64  That said, while pensions were the primary focus of its 
attention, the statute was written to be all-encompassing in two 
important ways. 
First, ERISA covers all manners of employee benefits.65  
 
(last visited May 2, 2017).   
58. Medusa in Myth and Literary History, MOD. AM. POETRY, 
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/poets/a_f/bogan/medusamyth.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q2L6-P9BN] (last visited Feb. 27, 2017). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Once an ERISA Plan, Always an ERISA Plan?, AM. B. ASS’N SEC. OF LAB. & 
EMP. L., http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ ebc_news 
letter/14_sum_ebc_news/erisa.html [https://perma.cc/JH8C-BMK8] (last visited Feb. 
27, 2017). 
62. As I never tire of telling my students or the unlucky few who read my  
articles, ERISA is so boring that it contributed to Justice Souter’s decision to retire 
from the Supreme Court.  Jess Bravin & Greg Hitt, Justice Souter to Retire from 
Court, WALL STREET J. (May 1, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB124114676548376235 [https://perma.cc/22RZ-P9M7] (noting that one Justice 
Souter preferred retirement over having to adjudicate “numbingly technical cases 
involving applications of pension or benefits law”). Roberts and Leonard thus  
cheekily, but rightly, describe ERISA as “striking fear in the hearts of lawyers and 
putting judges to sleep for over forty years.”  ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 28.  
63. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa 
[https://perma.cc/YG6H-N9C5] (last visited May 2, 2017). 
64. 120 Cong. Rec. S1537, S15743 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits); Dana M. 
Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 BOS. C. L. REV. 201, 
231-33 (1995). 
65. Patrick Purcell & Jennifer Staman, CRS Report for Congress: Summary of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), CONG. RES. SERV. (April 10, 
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Benefits are simply a form of deferred compensation the  
employer promises the employee; the benefit bargain is the deal 
the employer and the employee strike concerning the terms of 
the benefit.66  In ERISA parlance, all benefit bargains must be 
embodied in the form of a “plan,” which is both the sum of  
bargain terms and an entity that can sue or be sued.67  Plans are 
either pension plans or welfare plans.68  Welfare plans include 
all plans that provide, among others, health insurance.69 
In contrast to pension plans, which Congress regulated in 
great detail, Congress engaged very little in substantive  
regulation of welfare plans.70  Thus, while all ERISA plans,  
including welfare plans, are subject to important procedural 
rules,71 all those managing the plan’s affairs are subject to strict 
duties.72  However, the content of welfare plans is largely  
unregulated,73 and, like all ERISA plans, no employer is  
required to offer a plan at all.74  Congress did not highly regulate 
health benefit plans because there did not seem to be a pressing 
need to do so in 1974 when ERISA was enacted.  That pressing 
need arose later, and no one has ever accused Congress of having 
great foresight. 
Second, ERISA includes one of the broadest preemption 
provisions written into a federal statute.75  Although the moving 
parts of ERISA preemption have proved challenging in practice, 
they can be summarized into a basic structure.  As an initial 
matter, Congress provided that “any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
 
2008), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc822611/m1/1/ [https://perma. 
cc/T428-PWBU]). 
66.  See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1733, 1742-43 (2011) (explaining the benefit bargain). 
67. Purcell & Staman, supra note 65.  
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2)(A) (2012) (defining pension plans and welfare plans). 
69. Welfare plans are those plans “established or is maintained for the purpose 
of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of  
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits 
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation 
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship 
funds, or prepaid legal services[.]”  Id. 
70. PETER WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 12-13 
(Oxford U. Press 2010). 
71. Purcell & Staman, supra note 65. 
72. Id.  
73. WIEDENBECK, supra note 70, at 12-13. 
74. Purcell & Staman¸ supra note 65. 
75. Id.  
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plan” were preempted.76  That clause is restricted by ERISA’s 
savings clause, which exempts state insurance, securities, and 
banking laws from preemption protection.77  However, to avoid 
states labeling benefit plans as insurers and regulating them 
through the savings clause, ERISA includes a “deemer clause,” 
which bars states from directly regulating employee benefit 
plans.78  In addition to preemption under Section 1144, some 
state laws are preempted under conflict preemption, namely, 
laws that are incompatible with ERISA or its objectives.79 
The result of this unusual statutory confluence—broad 
preemption and little content regulation—means the states’  
authority to impose salutary content regulation of health  
insurance is quite limited.80  While many states used ERISA’s 
savings clause to enact mandated benefits laws that applied to 
insurance companies that sold policies to plans,81 even that  
approach faced a limit.  Large plans, and even small plans using 
stop-loss insurance, are able to self-insure by promising to pay 
employees medical benefits themselves.82  Because of the  
“deemer clause,” even state laws cannot regulate such self-
insured plans.83 
The healthism consequence is that, with respect to the  
provision of benefits, the states’ ability to protect against  
discrimination on health-status grounds is profoundly limited.84  
The state must find a prohibition against the discrimination  
under ERISA itself or under some other federal law.85  While 
ERISA does have a section aimed at barring interference with 
the attainment of any right one has under an ERISA plan or 
 
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
78. Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption under the 
Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 
23 J. LEGIS. 307, 316 (1997). 
79. Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (explaining 
that even saved laws would fall to ERISA conflict preemption). 
80. Morrissey, supra note 78, at 316. 
81. Robert S. McDonough, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 
1985 DUKE L. J. 1194, 1216 (1985). 
82. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How 
States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 
289-90 (2013) (explaining self-insurance limit on state power). 
83. 29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
84. O’Neill Institute, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: An 
Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options - 
Executive Summary, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 101, 120 (2009). 
85. 29 C.F.R. 2590.702(b)(1) (2012). 
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ERISA generally,86 that provision has proved difficult for  
plaintiffs to obtain relief.87  The general rule is that the alleged 
discrimination by the employer must have been taken with the 
“specific intent” of interfering with a beneficiary’s ERISA  
benefits.88  No relief is available where “the loss of pension  
benefits was a mere consequence of, but not a motivating factor 
behind, the termination of benefits.”89 
Proving an intentional discrimination claim under ERISA is 
difficult in practice.  Virtually all such claims depend on  
circumstantial evidence, as opposed to direct statements, that 
courts evaluate under a three-part test set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green.90  First, the plaintiff makes a prima  
facie case, showing that her discharge was intentional to  
interfere with the attainment of benefits.91  In the face of such a 
showing, the defendant has the burden of showing there was a 
valid, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s dismissal.92  If 
the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must show by a 
preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by 
the defendant were merely pre-textual.93  In other words, as the 
law of ERISA is currently understood, dismissal for being  
overweight is only actionable incidentally because ERISA would 
only protect an employee’s health status if it inextricably  
connected to an employer’s termination decision.  An employer’s 
decision to fire someone would have to be motivated by the  
desire to deny an employee some or all the benefits the employee 
otherwise was entitled to receive.94  Indeed, if being overweight 
or some other health status had some arguably negative effect 
on productivity or performance, it could serve as grounds for 
concluding that Section 510 was not violated.  Any effort of 
 
86. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2012). 
87. See, e.g., Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 957 (9th Cir. 2016). 
88. See, e.g., Barbour v. Dynamics Research Group, 63 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding the relevant question is whether an employment action was taken with 
“specific intent” to interfere with benefits); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 
834, 851 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). 
89. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988). 
90. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (This was not an 
ERISA case, but the test is used in connection with Section 1140 claims). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g., Emily Seymour Costin, Interference with Protected Rights, in 
ERISA LITIGATION, n. 91 (5th ed. 2014) (eds. Zanglien, Frolic, and Stabile) (citing  
cases holding that dismissal for poor performance is legitimate grounds for firing 
that does not run afoul of section 1140). 
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states to change this would likely be explicitly preempted by 
Section 1144 or conflict preempted. 
The current law of employee benefits is thus not  
particularly welcoming to Roberts and Weeks’ project.   
Moreover, given the pitched battles that routinely occur at the 
Supreme Court over even the smallest interpretative issue  
concerning ERISA,95 as a practical matter, benefit law may be a 
latecomer to any healthist revolution.  That said, Roberts and 
Leonards’ work implicates some more general themes about the 
wisdom of employment-based systems—implications that may 
not be a necessary consequence of their work.  Like much  
valuable scholarship, the healthist argument makes more  
readily apparent fault lines in thinking in other fields.96 
Although Americans are intimately familiar with receiving 
important benefits—namely retirement plans and health  
insurance97—through the workplace, the theoretical  
underpinnings of employment benefits mechanisms are rarely 
discussed explicitly.  In recent work, I have explained that  
employment benefits mechanisms should be conceived of as a 
species of regulatory intervention with identifiable qualities.98  A 
 
95. Since 2004 alone, the Supreme Court has decided seventeen ERISA cases.  
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016); Montanile v. Bd. of  
Trustees of Nat. Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016); M & G 
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015); Fifth Third Bancorp v.  
Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014); Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010); Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); Kennedy v. 
Plan Adm'r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. v. 
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 
(2008); Beck v. Pace Int'l Union, 551 U.S. 96 (2007); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. 
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); 
Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004); and Raymond B. Yates, 
M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004). 
96. Roberts & Weeks, supra note 29, at 908. 
97. Roughly 150 million and 60 million people receive EB health and retirement 
benefits, respectively.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT’S ESTIMATES OF THE 
EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE OBTAINING 
EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE tbl.2 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/ 
sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/03-15-ACA_and_Insurance_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XK5C-599C] (estimating that over 150 million people would receive 
EB insurance in 2012); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan  
Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2012, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1 
(Nov. 2013), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011-13.No392.Particip.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MKL-ETMV] (indicating that there were 61.6 million beneficiaries 
of EB retirement benefits in 2012). 
98. See generally Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 1257 (2016) [hereinafter REBA]. 
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rough sketch of a portion of that view follows. 
Some goods are widely believed to be socially desirable, 
which include “those goods for which there is broad agreement 
that society is better off if most individuals have or are able to 
obtain them.”99  For those goods, prevention of market failures is 
of particular concern to the government.100  If, for example, the 
market fails to make a sufficient amount of that good available 
at an affordable price, fails to produce that good at sufficient 
quality, or fails to distribute that good equitably, the  
government may consider intervening in the market to make 
things right.101  One form of intervention—an employment  
benefits intervention—is to regulate, through both regulatory  
incentives and prohibitions, labor deals involving the good.102 
Importantly, when considering whether an employment 
benefits intervention makes sense, an individual must be  
mindful of two comparisons: (1) whether it improves the world 
relative to no intervention, and (2) whether it improves the 
world relative to some other form of intervention.103  Frequently, 
employment benefits interventions are defended on the grounds 
that they improve the world relative to no intervention,104 and 
while that is often true, it avoids the question of whether the 
government has a less intrusive alternative.105  Moreover, with 
respect to employment benefits interventions, although the force 
of the justifications vary depending on the particular good,  
certain advantages and disadvantages will recur across goods 
and implementing statutes.106  I will discuss two of those  
recurring features here: (1) fragility and (2) opacity. 
A. Fragility 
First, employment benefits systems can be regulatorily  
fragile.107  Employers are not generally in the business of  
providing benefits,108 although many have started doing so to 
 
99. Examples include “[e]ducation, health care, home mortgages, pensions, and 
life insurance.”  Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1276-77. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. at 1286. 
104. Maher, supra note 98, at 1286. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1287. 
107. Id. at 1303-05. 
108. Id. at 1261. 
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please labor markets and attract or keep valuable workers.  
However, the more burdensome or costly it is to provide benefits, 
the more likely it is that employers will stop offering that  
benefit.109  Regulation more protective of beneficiaries is, almost 
by definition, more costly to the employer, and thus, regulators 
seeking to enact more protective legislation will face a  
countervailing threat from employers, namely that employers 
will refuse to provide benefits if they are regulated too strictly.110  
Not only is the threat credible—because employers exist to sell 
goods and services, not to serve as a platform for benefit  
distribution—but it becomes more credible as the unregulated 
market worsens. 
Consider ERISA and health insurance.  Insurance markets 
are different than regular service markets.  Insurance is a risk 
contract, and to properly price a risk contract the insurer must 
accurately assess the probability and size of expected payouts for 
a given insured person.111  However, asymmetric information 
and adverse selection make this process difficult.  First, there is 
often a difference between the true risk an insured person poses 
and the risk the insurer can ascertain based on the insured’s  
observable qualities.112  Second, the people most likely to seek 
health insurance are those who have a higher probability of 
needing it.113  In such circumstances, the chance that an insurer 
will underprice policies is high, which leads either to the insurer 
not offering policies in the future or raising prices.  Raising  
prices, however, drives away the better risks, for whom a higher 
premium is not justified, and makes the insurer’s pool  
smaller.114  The ultimate consequence could be no insurance 
 
109. Cf. Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 733, 754 (2016) (making the argument in the pension setting). 
110. Id. 
111. Ari Mwachofi & Assaf F. Al-Assaf, Health Care Market Deviations from the 
Ideal Market, 11 SQU MED. J. 328 (2011). 
112. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L. J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004) (explaining asymmetric information in 
insurance markets).  As Siegelman’s famous article points out, however, sometimes 
informational asymmetries and information processing disparities can help insurers, 
in the form of “propitious selection.”  Id. at 1226. 
113. Id. at 1226 n. 9 (citing EEOC: Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to 
Health Insurance, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 724, at 405:7121 (June 8, 1993), which 
defines adverse selection as the “tendency of people who represent poorer-than-
average health risks to apply for and/or retain health insurance to a greater extent 
than people who represent average or above average health risks.”). 
114. Siegelman, supra note 112, at 1254. 
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market at all—the “death spiral”115—or one in which affordable 
policies are offered to only a small number of people who are 
clearly good risks.116 
Compared to individual policies, group policies fare much 
better.117  Insurance offered through the workplace—in which 
the insurable unit is the group—is a means to provide insurance 
to group members who, on their own, would be unable to obtain 
affordable insurance.118  Thus, in the United States, unless one 
is poor (Medicaid) or elderly (Medicare), employment benefits  
insurance is essentially the only way to reliably obtain health 
insurance.119  The reality is that employers, regulators, and 
judges are aware this problem.  Correspondingly, legal rules, 
such as those that protect employees or beneficiaries, that make 
it more costly or burdensome for employers to offer health  
insurance put regulators and judges in a bind.120  Strong rules 
that lead to employers dropping health insurance could result in 
many employees being unable to obtain insurance at all.121  
Therefore, I predict that legal rules concerning employment  
benefits health insurance would be particularly solicitous to  
employers.  Consequently, under ERISA, they have been. 
B. Opacity 
Another problem with employment benefits systems is the 
confusion about who is paying for what, and who deserves  
socially desirable goods.122  First, as economists have long  
explained, employees in the form of foregone wages pay for  
benefits.123  An employer who provides benefits is not paying for 
them out of his own pocket as a gratuity; the employer is offering 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1236 (explaining how “normal theoretical conclusions about the  
optimality—and even the existence—of a competitive market equilibrium can fail in 
the presence of asymmetric information.”).  See also Jonathan Gruber, Covering the 
Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 574-77 (2008)  
(describing flaws in individual markets). 
117. “Adverse selection risks decline to the extent an insurer can insure a group 
bound together by some commonality other than an interest in obtaining health  
insurance—for example, the same employer, the same geographical region, or the 
same church.”  Maher, supra note 66, at 1770. 
118. Id. at 1767-68. 
119. Gruber, supra note 116, at 573. 
120. Secunda & Maher supra note 109, at 754. 
121. Id. 
122. See REBA, supra note 98, at 1305-07. 
123. Id. at 1306. 
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them as non-wage compensation, in return for labor.124  Yet the 
public often appears to believe benefits are paid for by the  
employer and gifted to the employee.  This sort of confusion 
makes honest reform discussions very difficult.  Second, the  
nation relies so heavily on employment benefits systems that it 
may have led some to believe that an individual only deserves 
health insurance if that individual has a job that offers it.  While 
that is not true—as readily apparent once the assumption is  
examined—to the extent that employment benefits approaches 
spread soft moral indictments like the foregoing, that is a reason 
to be concerned about their use. 
I do not think that the problems of fragility and opacity are 
ones that receive sufficient attention when considering  
employment benefits systems.125  Others, such as the fact that 
employment benefits systems do not reach the unemployed126 or 
are subject to employer manipulation,127 receive more attention.  
That is not to say fragility and opacity are more concerning than 
all other employment benefits problems, but merely that in the 
normal course they are often not considered to be problems  
worthy of discussion at all.  Perhaps, in the myopic nature of 
many scholars, I cannot help but see a commonality in Roberts 
and Leonards’ work. 
We can all agree that certain types of discrimination—such 
as discrimination based on race or disability—are particularly 
pernicious and must be dealt with first.  It may very well be that 
some health statuses intersect with other protected classes with 
sufficient frequency that people with those health statuses are 
protected against discrimination.  But—even assuming that is 
true, and it does not seem to be, it still seems like something is 
being overlooked.  Discriminating against those with a certain 
health status, even if there is no overlap with another already 
protected characteristic or class, can have undesirable  
consequences that, like fragility and opacity in employment  
benefits systems, observers often discount or ignore.  At a  
 
124. Id. 
125. One way to avoid both problems is to cut employers out of the picture and 
simply regulate the relationship between consumers and the providers of a given  
socially desirable good.  Directly regulating the provider is in effect, is what the 
ACA’s exchanges do: the socially desirable good, health insurance, is sold in a  
regulated, subsidized market, which includes regulations not just about the content 
of the good, but also regulations that make the purchase of such goods intelligible to 
regular consumers.   See generally id. at 1316-19. 
126. Id. at 1320. 
127. Id. at 1313. 
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minimum, permitting discrimination on health status leads to 
social stigmatization that, merely by the operation of  
subconscious bias, could result in an individual’s indisputably 
good qualities—such as being diligent and capable at their 
jobs—being overlooked.  Admittedly, legal rules that prohibit 
discrimination may impose high costs that encourage us to  
forego the laws and risk stigmatizing groups of people.   
However, that argument is weakened if carefully-crafted legal 
rules can easily avoid the undesirable consequences stemming 
from laws that prohibit discrimination based on health status.128 
To be sure, I do not claim a necessary connection between 
the flaws of employment benefits systems and healthism, and I 
realize that much scholarly work adduces previously  
unrecognized shortcomings in our thinking.  That said, in this 
commentary I am not only sharing general thoughts on Roberts 
and Leonards’ book, but I am sharing thoughts that reading 
their work prompted me, an employee benefits theorist,129 to 
have. 
It is with great interest that I look forward to the  
publication of Healthism, and to Roberts and Leonards’  
continuing work on the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128. For example, with respect to smoking, Roberts and Weeks acknowledge the 
possibility that smokers might have higher rates of absenteeism or other undesirable 
job performance effects.  See Roberts, supra note 29, at 898.  But they point out that 
such evidence is mixed, and that discriminating against smokers in the job  
market could have larger effects society deems undesirable, including reducing the 
likelihood that smokers will get access to the care they need, and disparately  
disfavoring historically disadvantaged groups.  Id.  Legal rules that can reduce the  
incidence of nicotine use without those negatives are more attractive and worthy of 
scholarly attention. 
129. I prefer to describe myself as an “employee benefits theorist.”  Many of my 
colleagues prefer to describe me as an “employee benefits nerd.”  But I am assured 
they do so out of love, which is why I send them, as a holiday gift, whatever  
scholarship on employee benefits I have completed in the previous year.  
